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1 
THE POLITICAL ANIMAL AND THE ETHICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT 
Josh Chafetz 
“Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human 
affairs with a philosophical eye,” David Hume wrote in 1741, “than the 
easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the impli-
cit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and pas-
sions to those of their rulers.”1  Hume’s explanation, unsurprisingly,2 is 
that “the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. . . . 
[A]nd this maxim extends to the most despotic and military govern-
ments, as well as to the most free and most popular.”3  For Hume, opi-
nion and opinion alone explains why a majority would submit to being 
ruled by anything other than the immediate fulfillment of its every  
desire. 
It is no slight to the great Scot to note that we still share his puz-
zlement as to why we accept government structures even when we dis-
like the substantive outcomes they produce.  Professor Daryl Levinson, 
in his fascinating new Article,4 takes up a version of this quandary and 
advances the discussion impressively.  In his formulation, the question 
is “why politically empowered majorities would choose to comply with 
legal limitations on what they can accomplish politically.”5  Levinson 
notes that James Madison clearly believed that constitutional structure 
would prove more durable than constitutional rights and therefore 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thanks to Will Baude, Aziz Rana, Cathe-
rine Roach, Steve Sachs, and Justin Zaremby for helpful and thought-provoking comments on 
earlier drafts.  Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
 1 DAVID HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, 
AND LITERARY 32, 32 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund 1987) (1741).  
 2 This explanation is unsurprising because of the role that habit and opinion famously play in 
Hume’s ethical and epistemological thought.  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NA-
TURE 455–76 (P.H. Nidditch & L.A. Selby-Bigge eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–
1740) (arguing that moral principles are discoverable, not from reason, but from sentiment); DA-
VID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 5, 43–45 (P.H. 
Nidditch & L.A. Selby-Bigge eds., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1975) (1748) (arguing that habits or 
customs of thought underlie all a posteriori knowledge); see also Leslie Green, ‘Because Everyone 
Thinks So’: Hume on Authority and Common Opinion 1 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 59/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697992 (“Hume thinks 
that law is fundamentally a matter of social fact and that obedience to law is an artificial, because 
convention-dependent, virtue.”). 
 3 HUME, supra note 1, at 32.  
 4 Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commit-
ment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011).  
 5 Id. at 659–60.  
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sought to enlist structure in the service of rights.6  But why, Levinson 
perceptively asks, should we expect that structural constitutional rules 
will have any more bite than rights-protecting ones?7  Why do power-
ful groups accept the rules of the game when, under those rules, they 
lose on an important issue?8  To paraphrase Hume, Levinson wants to 
know why it is that we submit to our constitutionally prescribed go-
verning structures when they produce substantive results at odds with 
our sentiments and passions. 
Levinson’s answer to this big question consists of a creative and 
compelling identification of various public choice mechanisms which 
bind political actors to the constitutional order, even when they dislike 
the immediate outcomes produced by that order.  Creative and com-
pelling — but not complete.  As I shall argue in this Response, Levin-
son overlooks another set of mechanisms, ones which work not at the 
level of material interests but rather at the level of political morality.  
After briefly summarizing the mechanisms that Levinson does identify, 
this Response then turns to describing both the content and the histor-
ical pedigree of the ones he does not.  It is important to emphasize 
from the outset, however, that I do not claim that ethical obligation is 
the sole or even dominant aspect of constitutional commitment.  I 
come to supplement Levinson’s argument, not to supplant it. 
I.  LEVINSON’S MECHANISMS 
Levinson identifies at least six public choice mechanisms as being 
responsible for constitutional commitment: coordination, reputation, 
repeat-play, reciprocity, asset-specific investment, and positive political 
feedback.  By coordination, he means that, “in many contexts actors 
will be willing to sacrifice their first choices of outcomes or institutions 
in exchange for the benefits of avoiding conflict and agreeing on a 
common way forward.”9  Levinson suggests that the U.S. Constitution 
fulfills the coordination function well by being specific about “low-
stakes issues, where agreement is more important to most political ac-
tors than achieving any particular outcome.”10  By reputation, repeat-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Id. at 662–63.  
 7 See id. at 663.  
 8 See id. at 705.  
 9 Id. at 684.  
 10 Id. at 709.  A quibble: Levinson seems to think that, for example, issues of presidential suc-
cession are “low-stakes,” a claim which allows him to maintain a tight fit between constitutional 
specificity and “low-stakes” controversies.  This seems clearly backwards — the Constitution is 
specific about who succeeds the President precisely because, in the event of presidential death, 
incapacitation, or resignation, the stakes are so high.  Cf. BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES (forthcoming 
Yale Univ. Press) (describing a series of situations — including some involving presidential suc-
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play, and reciprocity, he means those mechanisms by which political 
actors, recognizing that they are playing an iterated game, will agree to 
abide by certain rules of the game when they are in power, under-
standing that other players will abide by those same rules when they 
are in power.  “For example, Democrats in control of the national gov-
ernment may refrain from suppressing Republican political speech on 
the tacit understanding that Republicans will similarly respect free 
speech when they are in control . . . .”11  By asset-specific investments, 
Levinson means those investments that political actors make in order 
to enhance their efficacy in working within a given set of governing 
structures.12  Once those investments are sunk costs, those actors then 
have an incentive to maintain the stability of the structures to which 
those investments apply.  Whatever resources a political actor has in-
vested in mastering the art of lobbying Congress will be for naught if 
Congress ceases to have any power; the actor thus has an incentive, 
independent of particular substantive outcomes, to support the institu-
tional status quo.  Finally, by positive political feedback, Levinson 
means that the substance of politics can be shaped by the institutions 
of politics “in ways that increase support for the institutions them-
selves.”13  A simple example of constitutional provisions that produce 
positive political feedback are those (like our Fifteenth, Nineteenth, 
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments) that expand the fran-
chise.  Enfranchised groups are unlikely to vote for their own disfran-
chisement or for officials who will disfranchise them.14  The franchise 
expansion thus to some extent entrenches itself.  Important to all of 
these mechanisms is the relatively high degree of uncertainty about the 
substantive outcomes that any given institutional arrangement will 
produce.15  If certain groups know that they will never get the subs-
tantive policies that they want, then they have much less reason to 
care about coordination, reciprocity, or the loss of their asset-specific 
investments.  But in a polyarchic political community, most groups 
know that they will win on some issues and lose on others — they just 
often will not know in advance which issues are which.  Given this 
uncertainty, the mechanisms Levinson identifies serve to promote insti-
tutional stability. 
The preceding paragraph is, of course, only the most superficial ac-
count of mechanisms that Levinson describes in great detail — and I 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cession — in which the Constitution is less specific than we might like, and describing potentially 
disastrous consequences). 
 11 Levinson, supra note 4, at 711.  
 12 See id. at 686.  
 13 Id. at 687.  
 14 See id. at 689.  
 15 See id. at 694–95.  
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urge the interested reader to give his full account significant attention.  
It is an explanatorily powerful account.  Levinson has gone a long way 
toward helping us answer the question that Hume posed for us — that 
is, toward identifying the reasons that substantive losers respect the 
rules of the game under which they have lost. 
II.  WHAT LEVINSON OVERLOOKS 
A.  Legitimacy 
But a closer look at Hume’s own attempt to answer that question 
reveals an avenue that Levinson ignores.  After telling us that only 
opinion can explain why we willingly submit to governing structures, 
Hume goes on to subdivide opinion into “opinion of interest” and “opi-
nion of right.”16  Opinion of interest is “the sense of the general advan-
tage which is reaped from government; together with the persuasion, 
that the particular government, which is established, is equally advan-
tageous with any other that could easily be settled.”17  Levinson’s me-
chanisms all fall within opinion of interest — that is, they all deal with 
political actors’ expectations of the material benefits that will flow 
from existing governing structures.  Opinion of right, on the other 
hand, is not contingent in this way — it is an opinion about govern-
mental legitimacy, regardless of how that government distributes subs-
tantive goods.18  Opinion of right, in other words, takes seriously how 
people justify their own practices and institutions and what forms of 
argument they use to explain their constitutional commitment.  And it 
is these beliefs about governmental legitimacy that are absent from 
Levinson’s account.  That is to say, he does not address the question of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 HUME, supra note 1, at 33.  
 17 Id.  
 18 Hume further subdivides opinion of right into “opinion of the right to power” and “opinion 
of the right to property.”  Id.  By opinion of the right to property, he appears to mean the opinion 
that property holders have some greater claim to participation in governing structures.  See James 
Moore, Hume’s Political Science and the Classical Republican Tradition, 10 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 
809, 816 (1977) (“Power follows property, Hume maintained, only if the owners of property believe 
that they have a right to share in the exercise of government, and property owners entertain such 
an opinion only if they have been accustomed to take part in the activities of government.”).  Opi-
nion of the right to power, for Hume, is the belief that extant governments are legitimate precisely 
because they are, and have long been, extant.  See Sheldon S. Wolin, Hume and Conservatism, 48 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 999, 1006 (1954) (describing the opinion of the right to power as “the preva-
lent disposition of men to believe that governments which have endured over a long period of 
time were legitimate governments”). 
  This further subdivision of the category of “opinion of right” is not relevant to my discussion 
here, as I do not wish to claim that Hume is correct as to the sources of belief in governmental 
legitimacy.  But, as I argue below, Hume is correct that a belief in governmental legitimacy (that 
is, opinion of right) is an essential component of the answer to the question that he and Levinson 
are asking. 
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what our opinions about governmental legitimacy have to say about 
the structure of constitutional commitment. 
Levinson argues that, in focusing on public choice–type constraints, 
rather than opinions of legitimacy, he is simply adhering to and expli-
cating Madisonian political science.19  After all, did not Madison say 
that, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If an-
gels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on gov-
ernment would be necessary”?20  Did he not write that, “Had every 
Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still 
have been a mob”?21  Indeed he did — and no one could deny the cen-
tral role of institutional design, taking into account the sorts of me-
chanisms Levinson identifies, in Madisonian thought.  But these me-
chanisms emphatically do not cover the entirety of Madisonian 
political thought.  After all, the same man also told his fellow Virgi-
nians that: 
I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue 
and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom [for public office].  Is 
there no virtue among us?  If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.  
No theoretical checks, no form of government can render us secure.  To 
suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness 
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.22 
Had every Athenian citizen been an Alcibiades,23 no conceivable go-
verning structure could have saved the Athenian polity.24 
If some level of virtue is necessary for the perpetuation of constitu-
tional government, then what is the nature of that virtue?  And how 
does it answer the Madisonian/Levinsonian puzzle about why struc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Levinson, supra note 4, at 663 (“This Article develops the Madisonian logic of constitu-
tional commitment . . . .”).  
 20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 
Levinson, supra note 4, at 707 (quoting this passage). 
 21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 20, at 342 (James Madison).  
 22 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 536–37 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)  
 23 On Alcibiades’s relentless self-interestedness and lack of moral or civic scruples, see general-
ly 1 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 258–90, 322–25 (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Dryden 
trans., Modern Library 2001); THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 303–
10, 322–26, 332, 340–43, 417–24, 438–40, 450 (W. Robert Connor ed., Richard Crawley trans., 
Everyman 1993).  See also 1 PLUTARCH, supra, at 325 (calling Alcibiades “the least scrupulous 
and most entirely careless of human beings” in matters of “temperance, continence, and probity”). 
 24 It bears noting that Athenian power did not, in fact, survive the Peloponnesian War, in 
which Alcibiades’s machinations (on both sides) played a significant part.  See sources cited supra 
note 23. 
  
6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 124:1 
tural provisions are more enduring than the mere parchment barriers25 
of rights provisions?  Here, I suggest, we turn to Aristotle.26 
B.  Aristotelian Political Morality 
When Aristotle wrote that “man is by nature a political animal,”27 
he had in mind a very particular conception of politics.  To Aristotle, 
“he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is 
sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a 
state.”28  Beasts are unable to engage in collective life; gods have no 
use for it.  Only humans stand at the intersection.  Yet if we are natu-
rally social, says Aristotle, then we must be naturally political, as well.  
The necessity of living together creates a necessity of ordering our 
communal life, of figuring out how we are to live together.29  And al-
though it is true that the maintenance of “mere life” requires some po-
litical structure,30 a good state “exists for the sake of a good life, and 
not for the sake of life only.”31  We pursue virtue — our unique excel-
lence as humans — only when we move past behaving so as to fulfill 
our merely animal needs and wants and act in collective pursuit of the 
good life.32 
The fact that we are naturally political suggests that our virtue as 
humans must be bound up with activity in the political arena.  For 
Aristotle, it was the distinctive characteristic of a virtuous citizen “that 
he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices.”33  This en-
tails a willingness to rule and be ruled, in turn.34  In Aristotle’s words, 
“the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20, at 313 (James Madison); Levinson, supra 
note 4, at 662.  
 26 This is not a project of which Hume would have approved.  See Moore, supra note 18, at 
810, 820 (noting that Hume’s political thought is largely a reaction against the classical republican 
tradition).  But my aim here is to discuss the ethical component of constitutional commitment, not 
to provide an exegesis of Humean political thought.  
 27 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1113, 1129 (Richard McKeon 
ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941). 
 28 Id. at 1130.  
 29 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 26 (2d ed. 1998) (“To be political, to 
live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion, and not through 
force and violence.”).  
 30 ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 1184.  
 31 Id. at 1187.  
 32 See ARENDT, supra note 29, at 36–37 (“The ‘good life,’ as Aristotle called the life of the cit-
izen, therefore was not merely better, more carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an alto-
gether different quality.  It was ‘good’ to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of 
sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living 
creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process.”). 
 33 ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 1177.  
 34 See id. at 1181 (“[M]en are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is 
said to be a citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both.”).  
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govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman — these are the 
virtues of a citizen.”35  Because we are always already politically en-
meshed, the virtuous citizen cannot simply practice individual self-
rule; he must practice collective self-rule.  He must participate in 
communal governance, not to look out for his own narrow, animal in-
terests, but rather to engage with his fellow citizens in their joint 
project of discovering and implementing the best rules to govern their 
communal life.36  To withdraw from this project in the pursuit of pure 
self-interest is bestial; to withdraw from it in the pursuit of self-
sufficient contemplation is divine.  To engage in it is what alone marks 
him as human. 
C.  Republican Virtue 
This central Aristotelian idea — that we are always already politi-
cally situated and therefore that political participation, in the form of 
ruling and being ruled in turn, is the mark of a virtuous citizen — re-
mained influential in the modern world.  As J.G.A. Pocock famously 
demonstrated, Aristotelian ideas of political virtue were picked up first 
in Renaissance Florentine political theory,37 then in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century English republican theory,38 and finally in the 
Whiggism of the American revolutionary generation.39  In describing 
the durability of this idea, Pocock writes — perhaps a bit hyperbolical-
ly — that “[t]he classical republicanism to which John Adams still ad-
hered was basically a Renaissance rephrasing of the political science 
set forth in Aristotle’s Politics, and it possessed a high degree of capac-
ity for dealing with the social phenomena of the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries.”40  I do not want to over-claim here: the republican 
theory of the late-eighteenth century had been altered, complicated, re-
formed, and fractured in the two millennia since Aristotle.41  And the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Id. at 1182.  
 36 See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 68 (2d ed. 2003) (“[The virtuous 
citizen] took part in the determination of the general good, enjoying in his own person the values 
made attainable by society while contributing by his political activity to the attainment of values 
by others.  Since this activity was concerned with the universal good, it was itself a good of a 
higher order than the particular goods which the citizen as social animal might enjoy, and in en-
joying his own citizenship — his contribution to the good of others, his relationship with others 
engaged in so contributing — he enjoyed a universal good and became a being in relation with 
the universal.” (footnotes and citations omitted)). 
 37 See id. at 116 (noting the “profoundly Aristotelian” nature of political thought in late-
fifteenth century Florence). 
 38 See id. at 478–79.  
 39 See id. at 521, 527.  
 40 Id. at 317.  
 41 Indeed, Pocock’s magisterial study is devoted to tracing precisely this process.  See id. at 
vii–ix (describing the outline of the project).  
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relative status of republicanism generally, as against other systems of 
political thought, has fluctuated across time and place.42 
Still, one hears more than the faintest echoes of Aristotle when 
Edmund Burke tells the voters of Bristol that their Member of Par-
liament owes them 
[N]ot his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serv-
ing you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. . . . Parliament is a deliberative 
assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole — where not 
local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, 
resulting from the general reason of the whole.  You choose a member, in-
deed; but when you have chosen him, his is not a member of Bristol, but 
he is a member of Parliament.43 
Burke’s emphasis on the obligation of the politically active citizen 
to seek a unified “general good,” rather than to pursue “local prejudic-
es” is emblematic of the classical republican tradition.  At almost the 
exact same time, across the Atlantic, Connecticut clergyman Moses 
Mather was insisting that the “strength and spring of every free gov-
ernment, is the virtue of the people.”44  Mather recommended the crea-
tion of a system of public schools to instruct children in “the principles 
of virtue and the rudiments of government” because “this is the only 
permanent foundation of a free government; this is laying the founda-
tion in a constitution, not without or over, but within the subjects.”45  
In a sermon to the Massachusetts legislature in 1778, Phillips Payson 
insisted that “[n]o model of government whatever can equal the impor-
tance of” public virtue.46  And it is the same republican strain that 
came through when Madison insisted that good government depends 
on public virtue.47  As historian Gordon Wood has summarized, eigh-
teenth-century political theory prized republican government but rec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013, 1043 (1984) (exhorting us to remember that the Constitution was written in simultaneous 
thrall to “two, quite distinct, traditions” of political thought: classical republicanism and modern 
liberalism). 
 43 EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH TO THE ELECTORS OF BRISTOL, ON HIS BEING DE-
CLARED BY THE SHERIFFS DULY ELECTED ONE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIA-
MENT FOR THAT CITY (1774), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE ED-
MUND BURKE 89, 95–96 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 3d ed. 1869). 
 44 [MOSES MATHER], AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 67 (Hartford, Ebe-
nezer Watson 1775).  
 45 Id. at 68.  
 46 PHILLIPS PAYSON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE HONORABLE COUNCIL, AND 
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-
BAY, IN NEW-ENGLAND, AT BOSTON, MAY 27, 1778, reprinted in THE PULPIT OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: OR, THE POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE PERIOD OF 1776, at 323, 
337 (John Wingate Thornton ed., Boston, Gould & Lincoln 1860); see also id. (“Despotism and 
tyranny want nothing but wealth and force, but liberty and order are supported by knowledge 
and virtue.”). 
 47 See supra p.5. 
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ognized its fragility.48  “The [republican] state, like no other, rested on 
the consent of the governed freely given and not compelled.”49  This 
necessitated that the republican citizen be willing “to sacrifice his pri-
vate interests for the good of the community . . . [which] the eighteenth 
century termed ‘public virtue.’”50 
It is important to note that this republican conception of virtue 
cashes out in procedural and structural terms.  Precisely because the 
republican state rests on consent and participation, rather than force 
and fear, the virtuous republican citizen has a duty to obey — to rule 
and be ruled in turn.  That is why republican public virtue emphasizes 
the setting aside of private interests.  As a participant in collective self-
government, the republican citizen has agreed in advance to work for 
the general good and to accept the communal determination of the 
public good.  In Professor Aziz Rana’s words, for republican citizens, 
“participation in politics was both an education in virtue — through 
the Aristotelian experience of ruling and being ruled in turn — and the 
primary site for its display,”51 by demonstrating that one can accept 
the public good over one’s own parochial interests.  In short, this re-
publican conception of politics, with its concomitant political morality, 
gives the citizen a compelling reason to accept the substantive results 
of the decisionmaking process of which she is a part.52  It provides, 
that is, an ethics of constitutional commitment. 
D.  A Contemporary Example 
Of course, that may be all well and good for the classical world and 
the eighteenth century — but is there any reason to think that republi-
can theory has any significant motive force today?  I think there is.  
Before getting to that question, however, I should pause to note that I 
am most certainly not asserting that republican virtue can fully ac-
count for our acceptance of constitutional structure.  As I noted above, 
public choice mechanisms of the type identified by Levinson are ex-
planatorily powerful and undoubtedly account for some — or even 
much — of our adherence to constitutional structure.53  My claim is 
that a commitment to republican theory works alongside such mechan-
isms, not that it replaces them.  But on a divisive substantive issue, a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 65–
66 (rev. ed. 1998).  
 49 Id. at 66.  
 50 Id. at 68.  
 51 AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 122 (2010).  
 52 Cf. Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 364 (2010) 
(“[R]epublican government must be constitutional government.”).  
 53 See Part I, pp. 2–4. 
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relatively small number of people with independent republican com-
mitments can make a significant difference.54 
As for whether anyone today actually does hold the republican po-
sition, I think a recent example is illustrative.  Consider President Ob-
ama’s June 2010 dismissal of General Stanley McChrystal, his top 
commander in Afghanistan.  A Rolling Stone profile quoted McChrys-
tal and his top aides speaking derisively about civilian leadership.55  In 
the days after these remarks became public, a number of conserva-
tives, many of whom undoubtedly agreed with McChrystal’s criticisms 
of administration policy, publicly called for the general to be fired.  In 
a joint statement, Senators John McCain, Joe Lieberman, and Lindsey 
Graham referred to the comments as “inappropriate and inconsistent 
with the traditional relationship between Commander-in-Chief and the 
military.”56  Although they did not explicitly call for his firing, they 
made a point of noting that “[t]he decision concerning General Mc-
Chrystal’s future is a decision to be made by the president of the Unit-
ed States.”57  Bill Kristol took to the Weekly Standard’s blog to suggest 
a replacement for McChrystal58 — before McChrystal had been dis-
missed — and another post on the same blog was headlined, simply, 
“Why McChrystal Must Go.”59  And after the firing, National Review 
editorialized that “McChrystal embarrassed himself, offended his civi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Suppose that republican political morality has motive force for a quarter of the population.  
Suppose, further, that this quarter of the population is distributed evenly across preferences for 
substantive outcomes so that, for any substantive issue, a quarter of the people in favor and a 
quarter opposed will have a commitment to republican political morality.  Now, imagine that the 
constitutional process produces outcome X, which forty-five percent of the population supports 
and fifty-five percent opposes.  This is a classic case of the situation with which Levinson is con-
cerned — a “politically empowered majorit[y]” is being asked to “comply with legal limitations on 
what [it] can accomplish politically.”  Levinson, supra note 4, at 659–60.  But note that since a 
quarter of the fifty-five percent in opposition has an independent ethical commitment to support-
ing the existing political structure, independent of substantive outcome, a solid majority (58.75%) 
would oppose an attack on the political structures for the purposes of undoing substantive deci-
sion X. 
 55 See Michael Hastings, The Runaway General, ROLLING STONE, July 8–22, 2010, at 91, 92 
(“‘Are you asking about Vice President Biden?’ McChrystal says with a laugh.  ‘Who’s that?’  
‘Biden?’ suggests a top adviser.  ‘Did you say: Bite Me?’”); id. at 94 (quoting an aide referring to 
National Security Adviser Jim Jones as a “clown”); id. at 94–95 (quoting McChrystal and his aides 
as speaking dismissively about Richard Holbrooke, the administration’s Special Envoy for Afg-
hanistan and Pakistan). 
 56 Quoted in Roxana Tiron, McChrystal Faces Ax, THE HILL, June 23, 2010, at 1.  
 57 Id.  
 58 William Kristol, Why Not Petraeus-Crocker in Afghanistan?, WKLY. STANDARD BLOG 
(June 22, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/why-not-petraeus-crocker-
afghanistan.  
 59 Stephen F. Hayes, Why McChrystal Must Go, WKLY. STANDARD BLOG (June 23, 2010, 
9:50 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/why-mcchrystal-must-go.  
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lian superiors and colleagues, and overstepped his bounds as a servant 
of the U.S. government.  Obama was justified in firing him . . . .”60 
One could, perhaps, see this in terms of repeat-play and reciproci-
ty:61 conservatives support the Democratic civilian leadership against 
the military as part of an implicit bargain that liberals will support the 
Republican civilian leadership against the military, if it ever comes to 
that.  But this would not be a good bargain for conservatives, at least 
in the foreseeable future, as the military — and especially the officer 
corps — identifies (and has long identified) as significantly more con-
servative than liberal and significantly more Republican than Demo-
crat.62  And the conservative commentators and politicians quoted 
above are presumably aware of this fact.  Instead, I suggest that we 
take these commentators at their word and read them as, in fact, hold-
ing to an ethical sense of the role of the military in our polity.  Mc-
Chrystal violated the applicable ethical norms by showing and tolerat-
ing disdain for the civilians who are his constitutional superiors, and, 
as a result, even conservative commentators argued, he deserved to be 
fired.  And this is despite the fact that those commentators both care 
deeply about military policy in Afghanistan and (most likely) share 
McChrystal’s disdain for those civilians currently conducting that poli-
cy.  That is to say, these commentators subordinated their substantive 
policy preferences to their desire to preserve the proper functioning of 
the political structures.  And the best explanation for their having done 
so, I suggest, is that they subscribe to a republican ethics of constitu-
tional commitment. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In short, the motive force of ethical reasoning must be part of the 
discussion about the bases of constitutional commitment.63  Republi-
can political morality was an important element of the Madisonian po-
litical science that Levinson aims to explicate, and to ignore it is to 
give a misleading impression of what Madison and much of the 
Founding generation took to be the relationship between ethics and 
politics.  Perhaps more importantly, to ignore it is to ignore — and the-
reby to denigrate — the possibility of a political life that is grounded, 
at least in some part, in virtue, in concern for the common good over 
individual material interests, and in a common project of collective 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 Editorial, Afghanistan: A Test of Resolve, NAT’L REV., July 19, 2010, at 15. 
 61 See supra p.3.  
 62 See generally JASON K. DEMPSEY, OUR ARMY: SOLDIERS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 70–126 (2010) (describing political ideology and partisan affilia-
tion in the military). 
 63 Contra Levinson, supra note 4, at 707 (doubting “whether moral obligation alone could be a 
sufficient explanation of real-world constitutional compliance”). 
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self-government.64  Levinson suggests that such considerations “lie[] 
beyond the current reach of the social sciences, and certainly beyond 
the ambition of this Article.”65  But they were not beyond the reach of 
Aristotelian, Burkean, or Madisonian political science — and even to-
day, there are those in the social sciences who engage with such ques-
tions.66  And rightly so, as we cannot hope fully to understand our col-
lective political life without them. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 For discussions of the importance of the political ethics of collective self-rule in contempo-
rary contexts, see Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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REV. 4, 17–73 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 574–79 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547–64, 1576–89 (1988). 
 65 Levinson, supra note 4, at 691. 
 66 See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN 
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1998) (advocating a return to civil republican model of 
liberty as collective self-government). 
